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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HEGLAR RANCH, INC. 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VSo 
LEONARD Me STILLMAN and 
JUANITA P. STILLMAN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
16830 
The Plaintiff-Respondent, Heglar Ranch, Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation, owned by one Max Gillette and his wife, Elva (R-17), 
brought this suit against the Defendants-Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. 
Stillman, for non-payment of a promissory note. Defendant-Appellant 
Stillman responded with an answer containing nine purported defenses 
and a counter-claim. For clarity and brevity, the Plaintiff-
Respondent will be hereinafter referred to in this brief as "Heglar" 
and the Defendants-Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Stillman, will be re-
ferred to as "Stillmans". References to the record will be as 
(R ____ ). Following discovery, including depositions, interrogatories 
and affidavits filed by each of the parties, Heglar instituted a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Heglar takes issue with the statement 
that the affidavits of the parties were conflicting and submits that 
- , -
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\ 
a review of the Stillman affidavits and their answers to interroga-
tories, more fully discussed following, were incompetent and im-
material as evidence and were not conflicting in any evidentiary 
sense. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Based upon the affidavits filed by Heglar, the Answers to 
Interrogatories filed by the Stillmans and the depositions of the 
Stillmans, the Lower Court granted summary judgment to the Plaintiff 
Heglar in the sum of $25,000.00 upon the promissory note. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Heglar seeks the affirmation of the summary judgment 
entered by the Lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Heglar has no particular disagreement with the 
Statement of Facts as propounded by the Defendants Stillman except 
that it is incomplete and does not adequately explain the back-
ground of the negotiations which led to the execution of the 
promissory note and to the institution of this suit. 
On May 12, 1978, Stillmans entered into an agreement 
(R. 141-143, Depos. of Juanita Stillman, Ex. P-1) together with an 
escrow agreement (R. 134-136, Depos. of Juanita Stillman, Ex. P-4) 
which together constituted an agreement and escrow for the purchase 
of real property in Salt Lake County by the Stillrnans from Heglar. 
This agreement and escrow called for the deposit of $704,000.00 
cash or certified funds into the escrow from Stillrnans to Heglar, 
- ? -
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at which time the Warranty Deed of Heglar, then in escrow, would 
be delivered to the Stillmans. Because of non-performance by the 
Stillmans, the escrow was dissolved and the deed of Heglar re-
turned to it (R. 101). The transaction in total involved a three 
party exchange and included a Mrs. Woods of Salt Lake County, 
represented by Nolan Olsen, Esq., who are not parties to this 
action but were involved in a corollary escrow by which Woods 
would trade the Salt Lake County real property owned by them to 
Heglar at which time Heglar would make the sale to Stillmans for 
the agreed $704,000.00. 
Stillmans totally failed to meet the conditions of the 
agreement and the escrow of May 12, but subsequently represented 
to the other interested parties, including Heglar, that they were 
now in a position to obtain the funds and wished to reinstate 
the escrow and proceed as previously planned. Accordingly, a 
"Supplement to Escrow Agreements" (R. 138-140, Ex. P-2, Depos. 
of Juanita Stillman R. 100) was executed by the parties, June 23, 
1978. This document recited the execution of the previous agree-
ment and escrow and the termination "by reason of the failure 
of Stillmans to deposit the said funds as agreed' (R. 138) and 
provided by Paragraph 3 (R. 139) that as a condition of such rein-
statement, that the Stillmans would execute two promissory notes 
of $25,000.00 each, one being the promissory note subject to this 
action and the other payable to the third party, Mrs. Woods. The 
agreement further provided (Para. 4) that in the event that 
Stillmans failed to pay the escrow holders the agreed purchase 
- 3 -
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price on or before June 29, 1978, that all escrow documents in-
eluding the promissory notes would be returned to Mr. George N. 
Larsen, Attorney for Heglar, as agreed and liquidated damages 
for non-performance by Stillmans. This "Supplement to escrow 
Agreemen~was signed June 23 at the offices of McGhie Land Title 
Company by each of the Stillmans in the presence of their own 
counsel, Robert R. Brown, as well as the presence of W. c. 
McDermaid, Title Officer, whose affidavit appears (R. 55-56). 
Subsequently, the Stillmans again failed to meet the terms of the 
agreement or the escrow and to pay the purchase price as agreed 
and the notes were returned to Mr. Larsen who delivered Mrs. Woods 
note to her and whose off ice brought this action on behalf of 
Heglar to recover on the promissory note made to it according to 
its terms (R. 137, Ex. P-3, Depos. of Juanita Stillman R. 101). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE JUDGMENT RENDERED 
ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE SINCE THE FACTS AS CLAIMED BY 
STILLMANS OWN EVIDENCE DO NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
SUPPORT ANY FINDING OF DURESS. 
The "Supplement to Escrow Agreements" (R. 138-140, Ex. 
P-2, Depos. of Juanita Stillman) and the promissory note subject 
of this action (R. 137, Ex. P-3, Depos. of Juanita Stillman) were 
executed by Stillmans on June 23, 1978. Their Counsel was present 
at the time (R. 63, R. 146). The Defendants Stillman were aware 
of the requirement of the note two or three days prior to this 
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date, about June 21, 1978 (Defendant-Appellants Brief page 4, 
also R. 65-66, R. 67). The Plaintiff Heglar, following the 
depositions of the Stillmans, served interrogatories on Stillmans 
(R. 30-34). These interrogatories were answered by the Stillmans 
(R. 35-43). By these answers, the Stillmans appeared to have 
abandoned all of the nine defenses raised in their answer as 
well as their counter-claim, excepting only their claim that they 
did not sign the promissory note (R. 137) willingly, it being the 
claim of the Stillmans that they objected to the signing of the 
promissory note, but nevertheless signed it "so they could secure 
the contract papers from Mr. Larsen and deliver them to the bank" 
(Defendant-Appellants Brief Page 3). The Defendants cite the 
case of Fox v. Piercey, 119 Utah 367, 227 P 2d. 763 (Utah, 1951), 
where the modern rule concerning duress is approved by this Court. 
The rule is stated as follows (p. 766): 
"4. The modern rule that any wrongful act or threat 
which actually puts the victim in such fear as to 
compel him to act against his will constitutes 
duress." (Emphasis added) 
Plaintiffs have no argument with this rule as adopted by the 
Court except that it has no application in the instant case. The 
rule as adopted by this Court is further discussed in Corpus Juris 
Secundum at Vol. 17 Contracts Paras. 168-179 inclusive wherein 
the Court states, inter alia, at page 946, (and citing Fox v. 
Piercey, supra): 
"likewise, duress does not exist merely because a 
party is induced to enter into a con~ract by reason 
of adverse circumstances, and accordingly, mere 
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economic pressure or mere pecuniary distress, or 
fear of financial embarrassment, does not of itself 
amount to duress." 
and again at page 967, paragraph 177: 
"business compulsion vitiating a contract induced 
thereby cannot be predicted on a demand which is law-
ful, or an insistence on a legal right, or on a 
threat to do what one has a legal right to do." 
It is undisputed from the record that the Stillmans had entered 
into a previous contract which they totally and wholly failed to 
perform in any part. When they initiated steps to reinstate the 
contract, a condition was made, i.e. the promissory notes, of 
which they were well aware, and which they signed in the presence 
of their counsel. It is understandable that they would have 
preferred not to sign the promissory notes. However, faced with 
the condition required by parties who had already expended consid-
erable time,· trouble and substantial expense in a fruitless 
effort to complete this transaction on the first occasion, they 
chose to execute the notes with an outward show of complying with 
the condition, but apparently with some private reservation as 
to their intentions should they again fail to obtain their financing 
It should be noted that the Court while adopting the 
modern rule set out above in Fox v. Piercey supra went on to 
state (P. 766) 
"it is obvious that applying this subjective test 
might theoretically degenerate to a point where a 
person desiring to avoid a contract might claim that 
practically any conduct of another put him in fear 
and overcame his will. It is necessary that there 
be some objective standard for determining when duress 
has been practiced. It must appear that the threat 
or act is of such a nature and made under such circum-
stances as to constitute a reasonable and adequate 
cause to controlthe will of a threatened person •... Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Notwithstanding the fact that we approve this 
modern and liberal rule as a test of whether or not 
duress has been practiced, under all of the authorities 
ancient and modern, the act or threat constituting ' 
the duress must be wrongful .. " (Emphasis added) 
It should also be noted in the case of Fox v. Piercey that the 
statements made by FireChief Piercey to Fox that unless Fox resigned 
he would be discharged and that his discharge would be accompanied 
by detrimental publicity, did not constitute duress as a matter of 
law. 
Heglar submits that the requirement of the promissory 
note as a condition to renegotiating the contract while it might 
have appeared inconvenient or even onerous to Stillmans, was not 
a wrongful demand, but was within the legal rights of Heglar, was 
readily acceded to by Stillmans, who only objected to the signing 
when it became time to honor the promise as made. 
POINT II 
UPON THE EVIDENCE AS ADDUCED, IT WAS
1 
PROPER FOR THE 
DISTRICT COURT TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
THE PLAINTIFF. 
It is Heglar's contention that upon all of the evidence 
adduced by the Stillmans including their depositions (R.85-150), 
their answers to interrogatories (R. 35-42), and the affidavits 
of the Defendants, of their counsel and of Irene Strehle, hereto-
fore discussed that they have failed to raise any material issue 
of fact which would or could constitute a defense of duress. 
(R.61-77). First as to the depositions, the defendants admitted 
the execution of Exhibits D-1, D-2, D-3 and D-4 (R. 91-92; R. 100-
101, R. 145-146). 
- 7 -
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Defendants answers to interrogatories either completely 
evade the questions, as in interrogatory 1 and sub-interrogatories, 
(R.35), admit a lack of knowledge, interrogatory 2 and sub-inter-
rogatories (R. 36-37) and reassert only the feeble excuse that 
the Stillmans preferred not to sign the note or did not want to 
sign the note or objected to signing the note. Nevertheless, to 
obtain the potential fruits of their bargain they signed the promis-
sory notes apparently with some mental reservation as to their 
performance should they be unsuccessful in obtaining financing. 
Also, the affidavits of the Stillmans and their counsel and of 
Irene Strehle (R. 61-77) add nothing to the claim of Defendants 
Stillman, except that they preferred not to sign the note but 
were willing to sign it if it was necessary to obtain the possession 
of the closing papers which they did in fact obtain (Def. Answers 
to Interrogatories, 4C, .R. 38). 
The function of affidavits in the consideration of a 
motion for summary judgment has been considered in a number of Utah 
cases. See Preston v. Lamb 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P 2d 1021, at 
page 1022, where the Court stated: 
"Now, for an affidavit to be of effective use in the 
determination of a motion for summary judgment, it 
must set forth su9h facts as would be admissable 
in evidence Rule 56E URCP. Here the tendered 
affidavit did not support the allegations of the 
complaint which had been put in issue by the answer 
of the defendant." 
See also Montoya v. Berthaua Investment Company, 21 Utah 2d 37, 
439 P 2d 853 at page 853 P 2d as follows: 
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'~y employing the discovery process under the 
rules, by affidavit and interrogatories directed 
to each party by the other, they developed a clear 
departur~ fr~m pleading and proof, that precipitated 
no germane issue of fact, but one of law based 
on the evidence submitted by both parties before 
trial." 
Also see Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P. 2d. 624 where it 
is stated at page 367 P. 2d. 
"Where as in the instant case the materials presented 
by the moving party is sufficient to entitle him to 
a directed verdict and the opposing party fails either 
to offer counter-affidavits or other materials that 
raise a credible issue or show that he has evidence 
not then available, summary judgment may be rendered 
for the moving party." (Emphasis added) 
See also, A & M Enterprises vs. Hunziker, 25 Ut 2d, 363, 482 Pac 
2d 700. 
There is one further aspect of the defendant's position 
and the evidence and the lack thereof supporting it which deserves 
attention. In the third defense of Stillman's Answer (R.8) they 
alleged that they had caused $10,000,000.00 to be made available to 
the Bank of Utah but that the bank refused to accept the funds. 
Questioned on this transaction by Heglar's Interrogatories No. 2-A 
to G inclusive, (R. 31) the defendants answered that the $10,000,000.00 
dollars was made available to William Shaap, who was an officer of 
the Bank of Utah. However, in response to further questions they 
were unable to state (R. 36) (B) what officer, agent or employee 
of the Bank of Utah refused to accept the tender of $10,000,000.00 
{C) whether the tender was conditional or contingent in any respect, 
(D} in what form the tender was made i.e. by Cashier's Check, transfer 
of certified funds, cash or otherwise, (E) whether any reason was 
given for the refusal of the tender or (F) the owner of the 
n -
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$10,000,000.00 which was "made available" to the Bank of Utah, 
or even (G) the name and address of the persons representing 
the owner of the $10,000,000.00 supposedly made available. All 
of this conversation about high finance is aptly summarized in 
the affidavit of Bill Shaap (R. 50-51) when he states,inter 
alia (R.50) 
"Suddenly the telephone conversations took a differ-
ent turn and a loan from the Bank of Utah became 
involved. A person from Texas was claimed to have 
substantial funds from a foreign source. It was 
proposed that this person place a substantial deposit 
in the bank as a compensating balance to induce 
the proposed loan, however, on inquiry the persons 
involved refused to pledge this proposed deposit 
as security for the loan. Accordingly, the request 
was immediately and unequivocally denied. No deposit 
was ever tendered to the Bank as such but only a 
conversation indicating that the deposit would be 
tendered if the loan was made. The Bank, of course, 
would not refuse tender of any legitimate deposit, 
unless there were unsatisfactory conditions made 
a part of the tender." 
Apparently what this caller with the proposed funds was proposing 
was a deposit in the Bank of Utah, a very substantial loan from 
the Bank of Utah, with the right reserved in the depositor to with-
draw his deposit without any pledge of the same as security for 
the loan. The potential for loss ~f not outright fraud) in this 
situation is so apparent that it is hard to imagine that any person 
would hope to find a banker naive enough, or so eager for a 
deposit, as to accept such a potentially dangerous transaction, 
practically custom made for a substantial and devastating loan 
by a small bank and in fact a situation ripe for fraud. 
- 10 -
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Defendants 
Stillman with the Affidavits filed, their answers to interroga-
tories and their depositions, have not established any wrongful 
act on the part of the plaintiff Heglar and have only established 
that they preferred not to sign a promissory note-or as events 
developed, if they signed it, to avoid payment. It is further 
shown that under the law as adopted by the State of Utah there 
must be a wrongful act or threat which puts the victim in such 
fear as to compel him to act against his will. Such was clearly 
not the case under the evidence adduced. The Stillmans acted, 
according to their evidence, reluctantly and under terms other 
than those they preferred, but nevertheless willingly in the hopes 
that their plans would somehow be approved and they would obtain 
an unsecured loan from the Bank of Utah. 
It is further submitted that the evidence adduced by 
Stillmans is incompetent and irrelevent to prove any material 
issue of fact bearing on the ultimate issue of duress which is 
attempted to be raised. 
- 11 -
R Submitted, 
. HOBB 
Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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